War Diary Extracts - WW1 - Battle of Neuve Chappelle

Thomas George Rimell - died 14th March 1915

2nd Battalion The Rifle Brigade
March 1915

March 1st- Rested in billets all day - Bitter wind and snow

March 2nd - 25 Inf Bde handed over its trenches to the 22nd Bde of the 7th Division and marched into reserve. [6pm Battn was relieved by 2 R Warwicks and marched into billets about LA GORGUE SOUTH - Billets very dirty and insanitary.

March 3rd - 7am - 8am Company Parades - spent the day cleaning billets. 6pm found four working parties of 100 men each for work on B lines - Casualties - 3 wounded.

March 4th - 7am - 8am Company Parades - Musketry, Physical Drill, Bayonet fighting. 9.45am Battn Route march, attack formation. 2.30 - 3.30pm Training of trench blocking parties

March 5th - 7am - 8am Company Parades. 9.30am Route March. 2.30pm Training of Trench blocking parties.

March 6th - 7am Company Parades. Pouring rain all morning. Orders received to dispose of all surplus kit and move into close billets. 10pm working party of 550 men on B lines. Casualties - 1 wounded.

March 7th - Battns day for Divs Baths - Found a fatigue party of 250 new men on B Lines - Casualties - one Rfn killed.

March 8th - Before dinner parades under OC Coys. 2.30pm Battn Parades Attack formations. Small working party on Assembly Trenches B Lines laying out tools, ammunition, clearing wire and making bridges.

March 9th - Parades under OC Coys - Confidential instructions for attack on NEUVE CHAPPELLE issued to Coys. (Copy marked A attached). Battalion paraded 10.30pm and marched with brigade to assembly trenches. A hot meal was provided en route at CROIX BARBEE.

The day of the 10th March 1915

1. Instructions and orders for the operations were issued and were accurately carried out.
2. At 8.25am the Battalion was lying down behind the firing line of the Royal Berkshire Regt ready for the second advance. Formations - Four lines of small columns, each of half a platoon. At 8.35am the order was given for the front line to advance. Rapidity was insisted upon. At 8.50am the first line had reached the village sheet & the Smith Dorrien trench was occupied by scouts & bombfire. A message to this effect was sent to Brigade headquarters at 8.59am. A few of the enemy were killed and about 50 prisoners taken during the advance through the village : most of these were got out of cellars by the second line. The first line was ordered not to stop for prisoners but to get to the far end of the village as quickly as possible. Touch was at once obtained with the Indians who were level with us on our right & with the R I Rifles slightly behind us on our left.
3 The Bn was now on the line given as its objective & a position to entrench was at once chosen & work commenced. This is the position now held. During the morning a message was sent to Bde headquarters saying that there seemed to be very few of the enemy in front of us & asking if a further advance was to be made. I was told that our left was held up & we could not go on till they got through. The battalion continued to dig all day but lost a good many men from the fire of two field guns posted near [97] & [98] and from a maxim which moved up and down the road in front of the wood. At 5.30pm the Indians on our right advanced to a position near the R des LAYES a good bit in front of our line. The night passed quietly. Our casualties on this day were 4 officers and 112 men killed and wounded.

11th March

1. The enemy began to shell the village early in the morning. He also had commenced during the night a new trench parallel to the edge of the BOIS DE BIEZ which joined the other trenches about [95], This trench is about halfway between the wood & the R DES LAYES & is now their main trench
2. During the morning orders were received to withdraw when relieved by the W Yorkshire Regt & to form up with the rest of the Brigade behind the line [26] - [43] in order to become a reserve to the advance of the 24th Brigade. The W Yorks never took over our trenches and the battalion remained where it was. About midday the CO received a message from Bde HQ saying that if the enemy counter attacked he was to attack him in turn & follow him up. Replied proposing to attack [97] & [98] and asking for the support of the rest of the Brigade ; he said there was no sign of a counter-attack by the enemy. To this a reply was received saying the attack could not be sanctioned at present. Shortly afterwards a staff officer of the DEHRA DUN brigade came to the CO saying they were about to attack. The message received from the Brigade was shown to him & he was told that the battalion was not moving forward, (a draft of 1 officer & 20 others arrived.)

12th March

1. About 1am orders were received to be formed up ready to attack at 7am. The objective was to be in the line [97] - [98] & the CO proposed to move his left until it rested on the water ditch bounding the Château garden on its northern side. The CO wanted to advance in a direction parallel to the water ditch & perpendicular to the R DES LAYES & not at an angle to these obstacles as we afterwards did.
2. About 2.50 am the Indians reported they were leaving their forward trench & would hold the Smith Dorrien trench & nothing to the left of the Brewery Road.
3. The battalion was getting ready for the above move when about 4.45am the enemy made a counter attack against the whole front: this was easily repelled. When daylight came the ground in front of us was strewn with their dead and there was a great number close to the enemy's new trench showing that we had caught his support and reserves as they were forming up.
4. At 7.30am the time of the attack was altered to 10.30am & at 10am it was again altered to 12.30pm to be preceded by a bombardment from 12 noon. The CO endeavoured to co-operate with the Indians but they had orders to bombard from 12.30 to 1pm and attack at 1pm.
5. About 9am the enemy attempted a second counter-attack which was dispersed before he could get far from his trenches.
6. At 12.30pm our leading line advanced and was immediately met by a cross-fire of machine guns & rifles from the neighbourhood of [93] [94] & from the new enemy trench parallel to the R DES LAYES. These trenches are 400 - 800 yards from our position, the intervening ground being open plough intersected by dykes. Only a small percentage of our leading line reached the Smith Dorrien trench abt pt [56], The remainder were all killed or wounded. The CO ordered the attack to stop as it was obviously impossible to cross this ground under heavy machine gun & rifle fire from front & flank.
7. At 4.45pm orders were received to attack again at 15.15 and to rush these trenches regardless of loss. The guns were to bombard until 5.15pm. This bombardment did not in any way lessen the amount of rifle & machine gun fire from the enemy. The attack failed in exactly the same way as he first but with even more casualties.
8. In the opinion of the CO the attacks failed for the following reasons:-
1. because of the nature of the ground being plough & ditches running obliquely to the line of advance.
2. The distance was too great for any possibility of rushing the enemy trench. 3. The enemy had been strongly reinforced, was well dug in & had many machine guns!
4. The artillery bombardment was ineffective, probably from want of knowledge of the exact position of these new enemy trenches.
Under these conditions it was impossible for the infantry to succeed however large numbers were thrown into the attack, (a draft of 1 ofr & 72 others arrived)

13th & 14th March

1. Work was continued on our line. The enemy's shelling was very heavy.
2. The total casualties in the battalion from 10th to 14th both dates included were 12 officers and 365 other ranks killed & wounded, (a draft of 1 ofr and 95 others arrived)

15th March. Enemy shelling continued. During the night 14th -15th parties continued to collect the wounded & bury the dead. Work was also carried out in the trench.

16th March. Enemy's shelling abated considerably. Work in the trenches was handicapped by a shortage of RE stores. All dead buried in the area allotted to Bn.

17th March. Enemy shelled rather more heavily today. A large amount of RE stores were collected during the day. Also numerous spare rifles & a great quantity of ammunition. In the evening a Coy of the 1st Londons arrived and were attached to the battalion, 40 men being posted to each coy. Took over the Smith Dorrien trench in front of the brewery from the Indians and extended our line accordingly. A lot of work was got through in the trenches during the night, the parapet now from 4 to 8 feet thick in most places at the top. There are still a few gaps but the ground is very dry & firm. B coys reserve platoon moved to Bn HQ.

18th March. Enemy's snipers very active in the early morning. Shelling very spasmodic & comparatively rare. [Enemy sent out numerous blind shells of large calibre during the afternoon.] Work in the trenches handicapped by the darkness, however a lot of work was got through on the wire & trench. A very quiet night. Snow fell at 1 am and continued the rest of the night.

19th March. An exceptionally quiet morning. A few small shells about 10.30am in area in rear of trenches. Snow falling all the morning. Bitterly cold day. Shell pitching in parapet killed two and wounded two riflemen A draft of 3 officers & 205 riflemen arrived. Work in the trenches at night progressed, a lot of chevaux de frise being put out. A very quiet night. Snow fell again.

March 20th Quiet all day. Two men wounded in fire trench by snipers. Occasional shelling behind our lines. Relieved by Royal Berks in the evening. A & B Coys to support trenches at 27 C & D to HQ & machine gun to billets at CROIX BARBEE March 21st Rested in billets. A & B Coys formed working parties for Royal Berks during the night. Support trenches were shelled slightly by enemy.

March 22nd Rested in billets. A & B Coys were relieved in support trenches by C & D Coys. Roads round support trenches were shelled by enemy.

March 23rd

Rested in billets. C & D Coys in support trenches. Slight shelling in neighbourhood of billets. A lovely day. Rain at night. A German bomb accidentally exploded when being moved, by support trenches & wounded one man. A draft of six officers arrived.

March 24th [Rested in billets. Some rain during the day. C & D Coys shelled throughout the day at intervals.] Marched at 6pm to billets at La Gorgue. C & D Coys were shelled as they let support trenches - no casualties. Marched as a brigade from PONT DU MEME. Lt Watney & 5 rfn proceeded to St VENANT for a course of instruction in trench mortars.

March 25th Marched at 10.30am to billets between Estaines and Sailly. [A dull rainy day. Not enough accommodation in billets.]

March 26th Rested in billets. Marched at 6.45pm to billets NE of SAILLY. Hargreaves, Warner & Pearce joined in the morning from home having been posted to the Battalion.

March 27th. Rested in billets

March 28th. Rested in billets.

March 29th. Battalion parade 10.30am route march. Coys paraded from 7 - 8am & last drafts for musketry etc at 2.pm. Watney & 5 rfn returned from St VENNANT. Lt Col Lord Heuniker, cmdg 3rd Bn & Major W Seymour, cmdg 1st Bn called on the Bn this afternoon thus bringing three commanding officers of the regiment on active service together - a record

March 30th. Coy parade 10.30am attack formations. Drafts paraded for musketry in the afternoon. Inspected route to trenches to be taken over.

March 31st. Rested in billets. Divisional baths in SAILLY. CO & Coy cmdrs inspected the trenches we take over tomorrow.

13th Kensington (London Regt)
Operations 10th - 13th


On the night of the 9th/ 10th the battalion (13th Kensington) after a hot meal at ROUGE CROIX arrived at their support trenches at 4.50am. The artillery bombardment started at 7.30am and ceased at 8.05am. At 8.15am the battalion marched to the breastwork just vacated by the Rifle Brigade. German prisoners began to arrive.
1. am one company detailed as working party - 1/2 with Berks 1/4 with Lincolns - Half company to be permanently attached to OC 2nd Field Coy RE. At 11am the Battn moved to the fire trench.
At 1,25pm an officer was detailed to go out on a reconnaissance to get in touch with the Indians on our left - the information was obtained and given to the GOC
5.20pm - orders were received to prepare to advance
7.40pm - orders cancelled
11pm - 50 men detailed to take barbed wire to Rifle Brigade and R I R.

March 11th - 10.15am - 50 men, the party working for the RE was caught by a shell.
Casualties - 3 killed, 15 wounded. 2.15pm Breastwork heavily shelled. 3 pm - orders to reinforce Rifle Brigade.

2nd Bn The Rifle Brigade
Report on Operations at NEUVE CHAPELLE
10th to 14th March 1915


The day of the 10th March 1915 1. Instructions and orders for the operations were issued and were accurately carried out. Copies of these marked App:"A" and App:"B" are attached.
2. At 8.25am the battalion was lying down behind the firing line of the Berks Regt ready for the new advance. Formation - four lines of small columns, each of 14 a platoon. At 8.35 the order was given for the front line to advance. Rapidity was insisted upon. At 8.50am the first line had reached the village street and the Smith Dorrien Trench was occupied by scouts and bombers. A message to this effect was sent to Bde Hdqrs by 8.59am. A few of the enemy were killed and about 50 prisoners taken during the advance through the village. Most of these were got out of cellars by the 2nd line. The first line was ordered not to stop for prisoners but to get to the far edge of the village as quickly as possible. Touch was at once obtained with the Indians who were level with us on our right and with the R I Rifles slightly behind on our left.
3. The Battn was now on the line given to us as its objective and a position to entrench was at once chosen and work commenced. This is the position now held. During the morning I sent a message to Bde Hqrs saying that there seemed to be very few of the enemy in front of us and asking if a further advance was to be made. I was told that our left was held up and that we could not go on until they got through. N B (I cannot find a copy of these messages, my adjutant was killed and his message book and messages are lost.) We continued to dig all day but lost a good many men from the fire of two field guns posted near [97] and [98] and from a maxim which was moved up and down the road in front of the wood. At 5.30pm the Indians on our right advanced to a position near the R DES LAYES a good bit in front of our line. The night passed quietly and our casualties on this day were 4 officers and 112 men killed and wounded.

Day of the 11th March 1915
1. The enemy began to shell the village early in the morning. He also had commenced during the night a new trench parallel to the edge of the BOIS DE BIEZ which joins the other trench about [95], This trench is about half way between the wood and the R DES LAYES and is now their main trench.
2. During the morning received orders to withdraw when relieved by the West Yorks Rgt and to form up with the rest of the Bde behind the line [26] - [43] in order to become a reserve to the 24th Bde. The West Yorks Rgt never took over our trenches and the battalion remained where it was. About midday I received a message from Hqrs saying that if the enemy counter-attacked I was to attack him in turn and follow him up. I replied proposing to attack [97] & [98] and asking for the support of the rest of the Brigade. I said there was no sign of a counter-attack by the enemy. To this I received a reply saying the attack could not be sanctioned at present. Shortly after a staff officer of the DEHRA DUN brigade came to me saying they were about to attack. I showed him the message I had received and told him that we were not moving forward.

Day of the 12th March
1. About 1. am I received orders to be ready to attack at 7am. The objective was the line [97] [98] and I proposed to move my left until it rested on the water ditch bounding the Château Gardens on its northern side. I wanted to advance in the direction of the water ditches and perpendicular to the R DES LAYES and not at an angle to these obstacles as we afterwards did.
2. About 2.50am the Indians reported that they were leaving their forward trench and would hold the line of the Smith Dorrien trench and nothing to the left of Brewery Road.
3. The battalion was getting ready for the above move when about 4.45am the enemy made a counter-attack against the whole front. This was easily repulsed. When daylight came the ground in front of us was strewn with their dead and a great number close to their new trench showing that we had caught the enemy's supports and reserves as they were forming up.
4. At 7.30am the time of the attack was altered to 10.30am and at 10.30am the General altered it to 12.30pm to be preceded by a bombardment from 12 noon. I endeavoured to co-operate with the Indians but they had orders to bombard from 12.30pm to 1pm and to attack at 1pm
5. About 9am the enemy attempted a second counter-attack which was dispersed before he could get far from his trenches.
6. At 12.30pm our leading line advanced and was immediately met by a cross fire of M guns & Rifles from the neighbourhood of [93] and [94] and from the new enemy trench parallel to the R DES LAYES. These trenches are 4 to 500 yards from our position, the intervening ground being open plough intersected by dykes. Only a small percentage of our leading lines reached the Smith Dorrien Trench about Ps [56], The remaining were all killed or wounded. I ordered the attack to stop as it was obviously impossible to cross this ground under heavy M Gun and rifle fire from front & flank.
7. At 4.45pm I received orders to attack again at 5.15pm and to rush these trenches regardless of loss. The Guns were to bombard until 5.15pm. This bombardment did not in any way lessen the amount of rifle and M Gun fire from the enemy. This second attack failed the same as the first with even more casualties.
8. In my opinion the attack failed for the following reasons:-
1. Because of the nature of the ground. Heavy plough and ditches running oblique.
2. The distance was too great for any possibility of rushing the enemy trench
3. The enemy had been strongly reinforced, was well dug in and had many machine guns.
4. The artillery bombardment was ineffective, probably from want of knowledge of the exact position of these new enemy trenches.
5. Under these conditions it was impossible for Infantry to succeed however large numbers are thrown into the attack.

Days of the 13th and 14th March 1915

1. Work was continued on our line. The enemy shelling was heavy.
2. The total casualties in the Battn from the 10th to 14th both dates included was 12 officers and 365 other ranks killed and wounded.

R B Stephens (Lt Col)
March 18th 15 - 2 B Rifle Brigade

Instructions for Operations on March 10th 1915


1. Information of Enemy. Maps of NC have been issued and will be shown to as many NCOs and men as possible. Notes by Intelligence Staff have been issued and will be explained similarly
2. Information of Us. The attack is part of a big show. The Indian Corps on our right and the 7th Division on our left will take part. Our attack will be supported by five hundred guns. The 25th Brigade is the point of the attack and the Battalion will become the most advanced position of the Brigade. The 223rd Brigade is on our left and the 24th Brigade in reserve.
3. Intentions. The 25th Brigade is to take the village of NEUVE CHAPPELLE. The objective of the Brigade is the line of trench [31], [56], [30] and the attack will be pushed on with the utmost determination until we get that line. Rapid movement is of the first importance in order to capture the village before the enemy recovers from the effect of the bombardment.
4. Dispositions:- The 25th Brigade is disposed as follows:-
1st Line:- Left: Lincoln Regt Right: Berks Regt 2nd Line:- Left: Irish Rifles Right: Rifle Brigade
The first line is to capture the enemy's trenches and to get as far as [40], [39], [69]. The second line is to then go through them and capture the village.
5. Formations. The Battalion will be formed as in accompanying diagram in the cover trenches provided."A" and "C" Coys will be the first line under Major Harrison. "B" and "D" Coys in reserve. As soon as the Berks Regt leave the Fire Trench, the Battalion will move up there and will continue to move on filling the places of the Berks Regt as they move forward. These moves behind the Berks Regt will be carried out in small columns. When the front line of the Berks Regt is reached our front line will be down behind them, and wait the order to advance.
6. Objective. The objective of the Battalion is the line of trench [56] [30], The direction is the road [34] to [49] CHIMNEY CRESCENT. "A" Coy will be on the left of this. "C" Coy on the right. Machine Gun Unit will move along the road in the centre with the 2nd line.
7. Blocking Parties. Only two will be required, one from "C" Coy and one from "B" Coy. "C" Blocking Party will block the trench near [62]. OC Machine Gun Unit will detail one gun to accompany this party. "B" Coys Blocking Party will follow "B" Coy and be used as required, under orders of the CO. Both parties to have blue flags.
8. Ammunition. The men will carry from billets one bandoleer in addition to their pouch ammunition. Two more bandoleers per man will be served out on the RUE TILLELOY. These two will be put down where ordered, probably when the Berks Firing Line is reached.
9. Tools. The two reserve Coys will carry 300 shovels which will be put down when ordered.
10. Rations. Each man will carry two days rations ie:- The Iron ration and one other days ration. Water bottles will be full.
11. Wounded. Our own Stretcher Bearers will bring all wounded to the road [24] - [34] where they will be taken back by Field Ambulance bearers. All men are to be warned that they must not stop to help wounded, but are to push on with the utmost vigour. Headquarters will be first at the junction of the RUE TILLELOY junction with CHIMNEY CRESCENT, afterwards it will move forward in the centre of the Reserve.
12 Time. All watches will be compared and set during the halt for a meal at ROUGE CROIX.

App B
Battalion Orders by
Lieut Colonel R B Stephens
Comdg 2nd Bn The Rifle Brigade
9 March 1915
1. The Battalion will march at 11.5pm tonight. Starting point X Road at AID POST, 200 yds SW of "C" Coy billets. Order of march:- B. A. D. C. Coys. Route:- Road junction M.7.b - R1 EZ BAILLEUL road junction M.19.b - CROIX BARBEE - ROUGE CROIX - thence to position of assembly. The Battalion will halt for a meal at road junction % mile north of CROIX BARBEE.
2. The Battalion will carry out the operations described in the instructions issued yesterday.
3. At 7.30am the guns open. At 8.5am the guns will lift and the first infantry (Royal Berks) attack will advance. At 8.35am the guns will again lift and the Battalion will advance. The 1st two Companies of the Battalion will be immediately behind the Berks firing line ready to advance at 8.35am
4. Silence and concealment are most important at the position of assembly. No smoking or lights after leaving ROUGE CROIX until daylight.
5. The Indian Corps on our right will mark their blocking parties with a pink flag. 8th Division blocking parties are marked with a blue flag.
6. The new bright cap badges will be covered with mud.

Issued at 6.30pm 9/3/15 R B Stephens Lieut Colonel

Commdg 2nd Bn The Rifle Brigade

Transcribed from the War Diary of the 2nd Battalion The Rifle Brigade and covering the battle for Neuve Chappelle in March 1915

View death and burial photos page

Return to Military records page